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Abstract. Creating security architectures and processes that directly
interact with consumers, especially in consumer electronics, has to take
into account usability, user-experience and skill level. Smart cards pro-
vide secure services, even in malicious environments, to end-users with a
fairly straightforward limited usage pattern that even an ordinary user
can easily deal with. The way the smart card industry achieves this is
by limiting users' interactions and privileges on the smart cards they
carry around and use to access diﬀerent services. This centralised con-
trol has been the key to providing secure and reliable services through
smart cards, while keeping the smart cards fairly useable for end-users.
However, as smart cards have permeated into every aspect of modern
life, users have ended up carrying multiple cards to perform mundane
tasks, making smart card-based services a cumbersome experience. User
Centric Smart Cards (UCSC) enable users to have all the services they
might be accessing using traditional smart cards on a single device that
is under their control. Giving "freedom of choice" to users increases their
privileges, but the design requirement is to maintain the same level of
security and reliability as traditional architectures while giving better
user experience. In this paper, we will discuss the challenges faced by
the UCSC proposal in balancing security with usability and "freedom of
choice", and how it has resolved them.
1 Introduction
A smart card is a small, resource-restricted and highly security-sensitive device
whose fundamental goal is to enable secure services for its users. These devices
have been deployed in a large number of heterogeneous industries and used by a
huge user base. A smart card has an embedded device which is part of the plastic
body of credit cards and SIM cards. The inception of smart cards is rooted in the
need to create a highly secure device that is then issued to users, some of whom
could be malicious while others may be technologically naive. These represent
the two extremes of user competence/knowledge of smart card technology. Since
the 1970s, the smart card industry has created successful devices that satisfy the
core requirement: a product that is intuitively simple but at the same time has
high security assurance3 - even in the possession of malicious users.
3 Smart cards in certain industries like banking have stringent security requirements,
including a detailed third party evaluation based on Common Criteria (CC) [1,2]. In
To balance the security requirements of a particular application and its
usability is diﬃcult at best [4]. An application (or device) in the possession
of a malicious user makes balance diﬃcult to achieve [5]. The assumption that
an increase in usability might negatively aﬀect the overall security of digital
systems is not an exaggeration. Along with maintaining security and tamper-
resistance while in the possession of a malicious user, a smart card also has to be
designed in a manner whereby normal users don't have to perform complicated
tasks [6]. An example is the number of steps a user might have to take to access
an encrypted/signed email service. Johnny of Whitten and Tygar [7] was trou-
bled by the complicated and technology-intense tasks that he had to perform to
achieve the required security goal (i.e. encryption). In smart card deployments,
users are not required to perform complicated tasks except for banking [8] or
access control [9] applications. In banking and access control applications a user
might be required to enter a four (or more) digit Personal Identiﬁcation Number
(PIN). Aside from this input, the user does not have to do anything extra: the
smart card then performs the security-related tasks in a seamless manner [10].
To provide a high level of security and require the least user interactions to
achieve this, the smart card industry preferred the Issuer Centric Smart Card
Ownership Model (ICOM) [11]. The ICOMmodel enables a centralised authority
to manage and issue smart cards to users. Examples of centralised authorities in-
clude telecom, banking and transport companies, also referred to as card issuers.
Card issuers provide services to their customers via their smart cards; therefore,
smart cards act like a secure token that give them access to available services.
These card issuers maintain and manage the security features of the smart cards
and in most cases do not require the user to perform any technologically chal-
lenging tasks (e.g. SIM cards in most of mobile phones) [12].
However, since 2005 technologies like smartphone Apps [13] and Near Field
Communication (NFC) [14] have changed the smart card technology landscape.
Furthermore, Johnny of today requires more features present on a single device.
Smart cards can support multiple applications [15] on a single device, but such
an initiative did not initially achieve widespread deployment. However, with the
advent of NFC and the Apps culture, diﬀerent organisations have proposed a
multiple application smart card initiative termed the Trusted Service Manager
(TSM) [16,17]. In addition to the TSM, there are other initiatives including our
proposal, the User Centric Smart Card Ownership Model (UCOM) [18]. Fur-
thermore, a model similar to the UCOM has been proposed by GlobalPlatform
termed the Consumer-Centric Model [19]. In this paper, we discuss the usabil-
ity and security considerations that we took into account when designing the
UCOM.
1.1 Structure of the Paper
In section 2, we discuss the open card initiative which was one of the ﬁrst at-
tempts to oﬀer users freedom of choice. In subsequent sections, we brieﬂy de-
contrast, while smart cards play a crucial role in security for mobile telecom, they
do not require CC evaluation [3].
scribe the UCOM and user requirements that became the core of the UCOM
design. Section 4 details selected operations of the UCOM to show how the prin-
ciple of least interaction is used in practice. Finally, in section 5 we conclude the
paper.
2 Open Cards
In this section, we brieﬂy discuss the open card initiative and concerns about
the usability of this proposal.
2.1 Brief Introduction
It is diﬃcult to give an exact deﬁnition of open cards. In general, however, the
term open card is used to refer to blank smart cards that a user can purchase
from a supplier. After purchasing the smart card, the user can perform the role
previously performed by the card issuer and either accept or buy applications
from diﬀerent application providers. These applications can be installed onto the
user's card and used to access any associated services. The whole card is under
the user's control, similar to the card issuer in the ICOM. Therefore, we can say
that the open card initiative is an ICOM framework with the user replacing the
card issuer.
Traditional smart card frameworks like Java Card, Multos, and GlobalPlatform
were considered suitable for such a scenario. Most of these frameworks were built
to support the ICOM, and by making the user an issuer, they did not require
any substantial changes. However, as implied by Pierre Girard [20], such a mech-
anism would require an application provider to issue their application to users
to install on their smart card. This would require the application provider to
trust the user not to reverse engineer or corrupt the application.
Such a scenario does not ensure the security, protection of intellectual prop-
erty, and reliability of an application, as an application provider does not have
any control over the smart card that hosts its application. The main reason for
this lack of control on the part of the application provider is the unavailability of
any guarantees regarding the security and operational behaviour of smart cards.
Similar security issues are raised by Chaumette and Sauveron in [21] and they
make the open card initiative in its current form unsuitable for a user-centric
framework.
2.2 Issues with Open Card Model
In this section, we will only discuss issues related to the open card model from the
usability and least interaction point of view. As discussed in the previous section,
the open card model gives a user the ability to download an application to their
device of choice (e.g. desktop or laptop). Once the application is downloaded to
the user's device, she can then transfer the application to her smart cards. The
issue is transferring the application to the smart card: anyone who has worked
with installing applications on embedded devices knows that such a task is not
trivial. Furthermore, from a security point of view the user has to ensure that
during this process no malicious entity can corrupt the application. The user has
to perform several tasks and ensure the safe transfer of the application to the
smart card, increasing rather than decreasing user interaction. In the UCOM,
the least interaction principle requires the user to either not be involved or if
required, her involvement to be restricted to the minimum level possible.
3 User Centric Smart Card Model
In this section, we brieﬂy discuss the core design of the UCOM and associated
user requirements that became the basis of our subsequent rethinking of smart
card technology.
3.1 User: The Core of Design
A user acquires a User Centric Smart Card (UCSC) from a UCSC supplier, and
then manages it through software referred to as Card Application Management
Software (CAMS): shown in ﬁgure 1. The CAMS only provide an interface with
the UCSC and there are no security requirements for it (i.e. as part of the design
we consider that the CAMS implementation can be modiﬁed by a malicious user).
The user can then request a Service Provider (SP): an application provider
that utilises the UCSC functionality to provide a secure, reliable and privacy-
preserving service. The SP will then request the security and reliability veri-
ﬁcation and validation of the UCSC [22]. Only after the SP is satisﬁed with
the security and functional-support of the UCSC it will lease its applications.
The application lease is governed by a security and functional-support policy
of the SP, referred to as an Application Lease Policy (ALP) [11]. The ALP is
an SP-speciﬁc document and an SP can reject a request for application lease if
the requesting UCSC does not support the SP's ALP. Once the application is
leased to the UCSC, it can be accessed by the user at any compatible computing
platform shown as a Service Access Point (SAP)/Host Platforms in Figure 1.
For the smart card environment, a downloaded application might be a stand-
alone application that does not require any accompanying application on the
host platform. In the case of a smart card environment, the host platform is
the card reader that communicates with the smart card. The reader needs to
have an application (of its own) that communicates with the smart card but this
requirement is not imposed by the smart card's applications, and is installed
separately by the entity that maintains the reader. For example, in the banking
and telecom sector the reader only has to conform to a standardised application
(e.g. EMV [8]); however, in the transport-service scenario it varies, as diﬀerent
operators install their own readers with customised applications (i.e. TFL [23]
and Octopus [24]). However, in case of hand-held and traditional computing
devices, applications installed on a UCSC might be part of a larger application
that is actually installed on the host platform.
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Fig. 1. User Centric Smart Card Framework
3.2 User Requirements
A cardholder is an entity that uses a smart card to access authorised services. In
the UCOM, the control of a smart card is with its user. Therefore, cardholders
have complete control over the choice of applications on their smart cards. They
have the ﬂexibility to change the installed applications on their smart cards.
Furthermore, they can install or delete any applications they are entitled to,
at their convenience. The framework will provide the mechanism that ensures
secure control and ubiquitous management of applications on smart cards. A
cardholder's requirements in UCOM are listed below:
1. Security: If a smart card is inherently insecure, or if it becomes vulnerable to
new threats, it can aﬀect the security of applications installed on the card.
We cannot expect that each cardholder is technically capable of ensuring
and managing the security of the smart card; therefore, a cardholder would
require an assurance that the card platform will be secure and reliable even
if it is in the possession of a technologically naive or malicious user.
2. Privacy: Applications installed on a smart card represent the identities of
the cardholder in diﬀerent contexts. For example a college card, a health card
and a credit card represent a cardholder's identity as a student, a patient, and
a consumer respectively. These identities are in the form of applications that
have some unique characteristics (e.g. student ID, patient ID, and Primary
Account Number: PAN) to identify a particular user. Therefore, applications
on a smart card can be treated as the identities of the cardholder. In the
ICOM, these identities may not have any connection with each other. How-
ever, in the UCOM, any or all of these identities could be on the same card,
creating a privacy issue if one application becomes aware of the existence of
others on a smart card. Therefore, the identities on a particular card should
not have any links between them. For example, a college application should
not be able to ﬁnd out about a medical application(s) installed on the same
card.
3. Least Interaction (Seamless Framework): Most users do not under-
stand the technology behind a particular product (i.e. mobile phone appli-
cations). Therefore, the framework should not be based on the assumption
that an average user can perform technically challenging tasks. The UCOM
should be seamless and should perform all necessary tasks by itself, only
involving the user when required.
4. Interoperability: The smart card user will not want to buy a separate
smart card for each application. Smart card suppliers should provide cards
that support most of the available functionalities and SPs should oﬀer appli-
cations in many formats as possible, to support a range of diﬀerent execution
environments.
5. Ownership Mechanism: A mechanism is required that securely authenti-
cates the owner of the smart card and facilitates the exercise of her privileges
(i.e. installing and deleting applications).
4 Designing Security for Malicious and Tech-Illiterate
Users
In this section, we explore a few of the UCOM operations to show how a secure
system can be designed based on minimal user interaction.
4.1 Usability and Security
Selected UCOM operations that had to take into account the security and us-
ability are: User Ownership Acquisition, Application Installation, Application
Sharing and Decommissioning Process. Crucially these operations are managed
by the card issuer in the ICOM without any user input. However, by giving
freedom of choice to the user in the UCOM, the outcome of these operations
aﬀect the user's device.
4.1.1 User Ownership Acquisition A UCSC in its pre-issuance state is
under the default ownership of the UCSC manufacturer. When a user takes
control of the smart card, it will initiate an ownership acquisition process. The
process is described below:
1. The user initiates the ownership acquisition process through the Card Ap-
plication Management Software (CAMS) shown in Figure 1.
2. The UCSC requests the default ownership credentials, which are communi-
cated to the user by the card manufacturer. In response, the user will provide
the relevant default credentials.
3. On veriﬁcation of the credentials, the UCSC checks the mode of platform
assurance and validation selected by the user. The supported modes are
oine and online attestation [25,26]. Depending upon the user's choice the
UCSC proceeds with the security attestation process.
4. Once the assurance validation is communicated to the CAMS, the user can
compare the smart card features with those stated by the card manufacturer
at the time of purchase. If satisﬁed, the user will provide her credentials
and they are used to authenticate the user to the UCSC for management
operations (e.g. application installation, and deletion). The credentials can
be based on a Personal Identiﬁcation Number (PIN), a password, a pass-
phrase, or biometric data [27] depending upon the card manufacturer, and
the user's requirements.
The decommissioning process (section 4.1.4) is used when a user relinquishes
control of a UCSC to re-sell or scrap the device. The process is similar to own-
ership acquisition but this time the user requests ownership delegation that will
delete the user's space and any applications she has installed in it.
4.1.2 Application Installation In this section, the processes that support
the secure transmission and installation of an application are discussed. The
installation process discussed in this section builds additional checks around the
application installation protocols [28,29,30].
The installation request will initiate the process of acquiring an application
from an SP's application server (AMS in ﬁgure 1) and installing it on a smart
card. The entire process can be divided into three sub-processes: 1) Download-
ing, 2) Localisation, and 3) Application Registration. These sub-processes are
explained as below.
1. Downloading: The downloading of an application is initiated by the smart
card, through a secure channel protocol [28,29]. At the conclusion of the
secure channel protocol, both entities generate a set of keys for application
download and domain management. The smart card then generates an SP's
domain, provided it has enough space to accommodate it. The SP and smart
card will then start the application downloading process. The SP will ﬁrst
generate a signature on the application, then encrypt and MAC it before
sending it to the smart card.
The smart card checks the generated MAC, decrypts the application, and
veriﬁes the signature. A decrypted application is not a fully installed appli-
cation  it is the equivalent of copying an application to a memory location.
The next step is to verify whether the application complies with the smart
card's operational and security policy. For this purpose an on-card byte
code veriﬁcation is performed [31], which is already mandated by the Java
Card 3 [32]; this can be based on well-deﬁned on-card byte code veriﬁcation
proposals [33].
The UCSC does not mandate the security evaluation of an application. How-
ever, certain applications require evaluation due to government or industry
regulations (e.g. EMV applications). In these cases, an SP's application(s)
provide an evaluation certiﬁcate [22]. To verify the certiﬁcate the smart card
would have to calculate the hash of the downloaded application and compare
it with the Application Assurance Certiﬁcate (AAC) [22].
2. Localisation: First, the application will be personalised by the SP. Depend-
ing upon the relationship between the cardholder and the SP, with the SP's
discretion the personalisation can include acquiring user details (in post-
and no-registration scenarios), and cryptographic key generation. Further-
more, if the SP is issuing a card-bound lease then it would make sense to
generate on-card cryptographic keys. These keys will automatically become
device identiﬁers because each lease of the application will have a speciﬁc
set of keys. After personalisation, the downloaded application establishes
connections with various on-card services (i.e. shareable resources) that are
provided by partner applications. To access a partner's application services,
the downloaded application will establish an application-sharing relationship
that is discussed in detail in [34,35].
3. Application Registration: The ﬁnal stage of an application installation is
application registration by the SP. Registration allows the application to
access sanctioned services. Once the SP registers (sanctions) the downloaded
application, the smart card will also make it selectable to an oﬀ-card entity.
By making an application selectable, the smart card allows the application to
execute and access on-card services and communicate with oﬀ-card entities.
4.1.3 Application Sharing In this section, we discuss the architecture of
the proposed ﬁrewall mechanism for UCSCs. The proposed ﬁrewall mechanism
is based on the Java Card ﬁrewall mechanism as illustrated in Figure 2 that is
discussed subsequently.
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Fig. 2. Architecture of the UCTD ﬁrewall mechanism
A request for an application's shareable resource is handled by the applica-
tion's Application Resource Manager (ARM) and the Runtime Resource Man-
ager (RRM) handles access to the platform's resources (APIs): see ﬁgure 2.
The RRM controls access to the entry point objects that are used to ac-
cess platform services. The resource manager will enforce the security policy for
applications as deﬁned by the respective SPs, limiting access to the platform
resources as stipulated by the policy.
For each application (package), an Application Resource Manager (ARM)
is introduced. This component will act as the authentication and resource al-
location point. A client application will request a server application's ARM to
enable the sharing of resources. The ARM will decide whether to grant the re-
quest based upon the client's credentials (associated privileges). At the time
of application installation, the ARM also establishes a shareable interface con-
nection with the platform, enabling the application to access methods that are
essential for the application execution. The platform can access any method in
the application context only after authorisation from the application's SP. The
ARM also receives information regarding the requesting application. If the re-
quest is, from the system context, for a method that is not allowed to be accessed
by the platform, then the ARM will indicate a security exception.
An Access Control List (ACL) is a private list and it is used to facilitate the
implementation of hierarchical access mechanisms and privilege revocations. An
ACL can be updated remotely by its corresponding SP (when the application
connects with the SP's servers, the SP can update the ACL), changing the be-
haviour of its application's sharing mechanism. The ACL holds lists of granted
permissions, received permissions (permissions to access other application's re-
sources) and a cryptographic certiﬁcate revocation list of client applications. The
structure of an ACL is under the sole discretion of its SP and it is stored as part
of the ARM.
The operations of the ﬁrewall can be sub-divided into two distinctive phases.
In phase one, a binding is established between the client and the server applica-
tions. This process includes authentication of the client's credentials and access
privileges by the server's ARM. In the second phase, the client application re-
quests resources in line with the privileges sanctioned by the ARM. In both these
phases, the ﬁrewall mechanism facilitates individual authorised applications to
accomplish the application sharing, while prohibiting unauthorised applications
from accessing the resources of an application.
4.1.4 Decommissioning Process The decommissioning process involves de-
letion of all applications from a UCSC and removal of any user-speciﬁc data
stored by the applications and card management system. The decommissioning
process is initiated by the user in a manner similar to the ownership acquisition
process (section 4.1.1). However, in the decommissioning process the user re-
quests a UCSC to delete all applications in a manner similar to the one discussed
in the previous section but this time the UCSC does not check for dependencies.
Once all applications are deleted, the card security manager will delete the user-
speciﬁc cryptographic keys (e.g. user signature key) and associated certiﬁcates.
It will then request the deletion of ownership credentials that the user has set
during the ownership acquisition process. After the decommissioning process is
completed, the UCSC reverts to the state it was in when the user acquired it
from the card manufacturer (or UCSC suppliers). In other words, it is a blank
UCSC.
5 Conclusion
The proposal for the UCOM began with a simple question can a user have
application control on a security-sensitive device like a smart card in a simple
but secure manner?. The work on the UCOM has not yet resolved all the issues
and modiﬁcations required to completely abandoned the ICOM. However, work
to date has a common foundation namely least interaction, which requires the
user's involvement in diﬀerent UCSC management operations to be kept to a
minimum. This enabled us to design a secure, yet user friendly framework to
support UCSC.
The work done up till now on the concept of UCOM has shown that a ro-
bust and secure system does not have to be diﬃcult for ordinary users to un-
derstand/use. We consider that such eﬀects, making the security of a system
intuitive, seamless and requiring the minimum of user interaction, might lead
the way for better, more reliable and secure systems.
References
1. P. Dusart, D. Sauveron, and K. Tai-Hoon, Some Limits of Common Criteria Cer-
tiﬁcation, International Journal of Security and its Applications, vol. 2, no. 4, pp.
11  20, October 2008.
2. D. Sauveron and P. Dusart, Which Trust Can Be Expected of the Common Cri-
teria Certiﬁcation at End-User Level? Future Generation Communication and
Networking, vol. 2, pp. 423428, 2007.
3. C. Xenakis and L. Merakos, Security in Third Generation Mobile Networks,
Computer communications, vol. 27, no. 7, pp. 638650, 2004.
4. E. E. Schultz, Research on Usability in Information Security, Computer Fraud &
Security, vol. 2007, no. 6, pp. 810, 2007.
5. R. Anderson and T. Moore, Information Security Economicsand Beyond, in
Advances in Cryptology-CRYPTO 2007. Springer, 2007, pp. 6891.
6. I. G. Askoxylakis, M. Pramateftakis, D. D. Kastanis, and A. P. Traganitis, Inte-
gration of a Secure Mobile Payment System in a GSM/UMTS SIM Smart Card, in
Proceedings of the Fourth IASTED International Conference on Communication,
Network and Information Security, ser. CNIS '07. Anaheim, CA, USA: ACTA
Press, 2007, pp. 4050.
7. A. Whitten and J. D. Tygar, Why Johnny Can'T Encrypt: A Usability Evaluation
of PGP 5.0, in Proceedings of the 8th Conference on USENIX Security Symposium
- Volume 8, ser. SSYM'99. CA, USA: USENIX Association, 1999, pp. 1414.
8. EMV 4.2, Online, EMVCo Speciﬁcation 4.2, May 2008. [Online]. Available:
http://www.emvco.com/speciﬁcations.aspx?id=155
9. Entity Authentication Assurance Framework, ITU-T, Geneva, Switzerland,
Recommendation ITU-T X.1254, September 2012. [Online]. Available: http:
//www.itu.int/rec/T-REC-X.1254-201209-I
10. A. Mitrokotsa, Q. Z. Sheng, and Z. Maamar, User-driven RFID applications and
challenges, Personal and Ubiquitous Computing, vol. 16, no. 3, pp. 223224, 2012.
11. R. N. Akram, K. Markantonakis, and K. Mayes, Application Management Frame-
work in User Centric Smart Card Ownership Model, in The 10th International
Workshop on Information Security Applications (WISA09), ser. LNCS, H. Y.
YOUM and M. Yung, Eds., vol. 5932/2009. Busan, Korea: Springer, August
2009, pp. 2035.
12. N. E. Petroulakis, I. G. Askoxylakis, and T. Tryfonas, Life-logging in Smart En-
vironments: Challenges and Security Threats, in Communications (ICC), 2012
IEEE International Conference on. IEEE, 2012, pp. 56805684.
13. J. Laugesen and Y. Yuan, What Factors Contributed to the Success of Apple's
iPhone? in Proceedings of the 2010 Ninth International Conference on Mobile
Business / 2010 Ninth Global Mobility Roundtable, ser. ICMB-GMR '10. Wash-
ington, DC, USA: IEEE Computer Society, 2010, pp. 9199.
14. Near Field Communications (NFC). Simplifying and Expanding. Contact-
less Commerce, Connectivity, and Content, Online, ABI Research, Oyster
Bay, NY, 2006. [Online]. Available: http://www.abiresearch.com/research/
1000885-Near-Field_Communications_(NFC)
15. D. Sauveron, Multiapplication Smart Card: Towards an Open Smart Card? Inf.
Secur. Tech. Rep., vol. 14, no. 2, pp. 7078, 2009.
16. The GlobalPlatform Proposition for NFC Mobile: Secure Element Management
and Messaging, GlobalPlatform, White Paper, April 2009.
17. Mobile NFC Services, GSM Association, White Paper Version 1.0, 2007. [Online].
Available: http://www.gsmworld.com/documents/nfc_services_0207.pdf
18. R. N. Akram, K. Markantonakis, and K. Mayes, A Paradigm Shift in Smart
Card Ownership Model, in Proceedings of the 2010 International Conference on
Computational Science and Its Applications (ICCSA 2010), Bernady O. Apduhan,
Osvaldo Gervasi, Andres Iglesias, D. Taniar, and M. Gavrilova, Eds. Fukuoka,
Japan: IEEE Computer Society, March 2010, pp. 191200.
19. GlobalPlatform A New Model: The Consumer-Centric Model and How It Applies
to the Mobile Ecosystem, GlobalPlatform, Whitepaper, March 2013.
20. P. Girard, Which Security Policy for Multiplication Smart Cards? in Proceedings
of the USENIX Workshop on Smartcard Technology on USENIX Workshop on
Smartcard Technology. Berkeley, CA, USA: USENIX Association, 1999, pp. 33.
[Online]. Available: http://portal.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=1267115.1267118
21. S. Chaumette and D. Sauveron, New Security Problems Raised by Open Multi-
application Smart Cards. LaBRI, Université Bordeaux 1., pp. 133204, 2004.
22. R. N. Akram, K. Markantonakis, and K. Mayes, A Dynamic and Ubiquitous Smart
Card Security Assurance and Validation Mechanism, in 25th IFIP International
Information Security Conference (SEC 2010), ser. IFIP AICT Series, Kai Rannen-
berg and V. Varadharajan, Eds. Brisbane, Australia: Springer, September 2010,
pp. 161171.
23. (Visited June, 2010) London Underground: Oyster Card. London Underground.
United Kingdom. [Online]. Available: https://oyster.tﬂ.gov.uk/oyster/entry.do
24. (Visited December, 2010) Octopus. Octopus Holdings Ltd. Hong Kong, China.
[Online]. Available: http://www.octopus.com.hk/home/en/index.html
25. R. N. Akram, K. Markantonakis, and K. Mayes, Remote Attestation Mechanism
based on Physical Unclonable Functions, in The 2013 Workshop on RFID and
IoT Security (RFIDsec'13 Asia), C. M. J. Zhou and J. Weng, Eds. Guangzhou,
China: IOS Press., November 2013.
26. , Remote Attestation Mechanism for User Centric Smart Cards using Pseu-
dorandom Number Generators, in 5th International Conference on Information
and Communications Security (ICICS 2013), S. Qing and J. Zhou, Eds. Beijing,
China: Springer, November 2013.
27. J. Bringer, H. Chabanne, T. Kevenaar, and B. Kindarji, Extending Match-
On-Card to Local Biometric Identiﬁcation, in Biometric ID Management
and Multimodal Communication, ser. Lecture Notes in Computer Science,
J. Fierrez, J. Ortega-Garcia, A. Esposito, A. Drygajlo, and M. Faundez-Zanuy,
Eds. Springer Berlin / Heidelberg, 2009, vol. 5707, pp. 178186, 10.1007/978-
3-642-04391-8_23. [Online]. Available: http://www.springerlink.com/content/
b16016708315549v/fulltext.pdf
28. R. N. Akram, K. Markantonakis, and K. Mayes, A Privacy Preserving Application
Acquisition Protocol, in 11th IEEE International Conference on Trust, Security
and Privacy in Computing and Communications (IEEE TrustCom-12), F. G. M.
Geyong Min, Ed. Liverpool, United Kingdom: IEEE Computer Society, June
2012.
29. , A Secure and Trusted Channel Protocol for the User Centric Smart Card
Ownership Model, in 12th IEEE International Conference on Trust, Security and
Privacy in Computing and Communications (IEEE TrustCom-13). Melbourne,
Australia: IEEE Computer Society, 2013.
30. , Coopetitive Architecture to Support a Dynamic and Scalable NFC based
Mobile Services Architecture, in The 2012 International Conference on Informa-
tion and Communications Security (ICICS 2012), K. Chow and L. C. Hui, Eds.
Hong Kong, China: Springer, October 2012.
31. D. A. Basin, S. Friedrich, J. Posegga, and H. Vogt, Java Bytecode Veriﬁcation by
Model Checking, in CAV '99: Proceedings of the 11th International Conference on
Computer Aided Veriﬁcation. London, UK: Springer-Verlag, 1999, pp. 491494.
32. Java Card Platform Speciﬁcation: Classic Edition; Application Programming In-
terface, Runtime Environment Speciﬁcation, Virtual Machine Speciﬁcation, Con-
nected Edition; Runtime Environment Speciﬁcation, Java Servlet Speciﬁcation, Ap-
plication Programming Interface, Virtual Machine Speciﬁcation, Sample Structure
of Application Modules, Sun Microsystem Inc Std. Version 3.0.1, May 2009.
33. D. A. Basin, S. Friedrich, and M. Gawkowski, Veriﬁed Bytecode Model Checkers,
in TPHOLs '02: Proceedings of the 15th International Conference on Theorem
Proving in Higher Order Logics. London, UK: Springer-Verlag, 2002, pp. 4766.
34. R. N. Akram, K. Markantonakis, and K. Mayes, Firewall Mechanism in a User
Centric Smart Card Ownership Model, in Smart Card Research and Advanced
Application, 9th IFIP WG 8.8/11.2 International Conference, CARDIS 2010, ser.
LNCS, D. Gollmann, J.-L. Lanet, and J. Iguchi-Cartigny, Eds., vol. 6035/2010.
Passau, Germany: Springer, April 2010, pp. 118132.
35. , Application-Binding Protocol in the User Centric Smart Card Ownership
Model, in the 16th Australasian Conference on Information Security and Privacy
(ACISP), ser. LNCS, U. Parampalli and P. Hawkes, Eds. Melbourne, Australia:
Springer, July 2011, pp. 208225.
